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Foreign Direct Investment, Ecological Withdrawals and Natural Resource Dependent 
Economies 
 
Abstract 
This article examines the relationships between foreign direct investment (FDI) and natural 
resource depletion and natural resource rents for a longitudinal (2005-2013: N=125 nations) 
sample of less developed countries (LDCs).  Theoretically, we argue that FDI contributes to 
increased ecological withdrawals and dependence on the natural resource sector for economic 
growth within countries.  We hypothesized that LDCs with higher levels of FDI would also 
have higher levels of natural resource depletion and income (i.e. rents).  We assess whether 
this hypothesized relationship holds across nations in our sample for four different natural 
resource depletion and rents measures (energy, forest, mineral and total natural resource 
rents).  We find strong support for our hypotheses regarding natural resource depletion and 
resource rents, with the exception of energy rents.  The outcome lends support to the 
ecological withdrawal and ecostructural theory of foreign investment dependence 
perspectives.  
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Introduction 
Natural resource extraction and the income dependence it generates has been the subject of 
significant sociological analysis over the past twenty years (Gelb 1988; Freudenburg 1992; 
Jorgenson 2010; Ross 2003). Recently, however, there has been interest in examining how 
these variables play out cross-nationally, where some less developed countries (or LDCs) 
serve as natural resource ‘supply depots’ and as a result subsequently develop unhealthy 
economies (e.g., Jorgenson 2007a, 2007b). We extend this particular line of sociological 
inquiry by asking two important questions. First, how does foreign investment (i.e. stocks of 
capital originating from foreign firms that are invested in a second country) appear to 
influence the level of natural resource extraction within LDCs? Second, how does foreign 
investment by firms in one country influence the composition of natural resource income 
(i.e., the income generated from the extraction and sale of natural resources) as a proportion 
of the gross domestic product in LDCs? Both questions are important for understanding the 
role of transnational capital investment in maintaining global economic inequality and the 
treadmill of production.  In turn, economic inequality is also associated with ecological 
inequality or ecologically unequal exchange (Jorgenson 2009, 2010). Importantly, the 
production and consumption of goods in the world economy ties countries together 
suggesting that a global understanding of natural resource extraction and income is critical 
for scholars and policy makers trying to understand how cross-national environmental 
inequality is produced by these connections. 
To understand how foreign investment may be related to extraction and natural 
resource income in LDCs, we organize the paper as follows. First, we briefly review 
sociological research on foreign investment (or foreign direct investment [FDI]), which is a 
measure of capital created in one country and subsequently invested in another country. Next, 
we examine the concept of FDI as it relates to ecological withdrawals, the transnational 
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organization of production and the ecostructural approach. In that discussion we highlight the 
importance of these theoretical concepts in explaining the potential relationship between FDI 
and natural resource extraction and natural resource income. That literature is then used to 
frame our hypotheses, methodology and results. The final section expands on the 
relationships between FDI, ecological withdrawals and natural resource dependent 
economies.  
Foreign Direct Investment 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is capital from a firm originating in one country that is 
invested in a second country.1 Research in comparative cross-national sociology has 
demonstrated the large impact that the penetration of foreign capital can have on countries 
(e.g. Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 1985; Dixon and Boswell 1996). The effect of FDI is 
widespread as, FDI “inflows have grown faster than world income since the 1960s, 
multinational enterprises now account for about 70 percent of world trade, and the sales of 
their foreign affiliates have exceeded total global exports” (Li and Resnick 2003). 
Scholars have studied the impact of FDI on numerous social justice related outcomes 
including economic growth (Bornschier, Chase-Dunn and Rubinson 1978), international 
migration (Sanderson and Kentor 2008), human rights (Blanton and Blanton 2007), and the 
environment (Jorgenson 2007a, b, 2009; Jorgenson, Dick and Mahutga 2007; McKinney 
2014).  Here we focus attention on the environmental consequences of FDI. In particular, we 
suggest that FDI plays an important role in depleting nature resources and generating natural 
resource income in LDCs (FDI; Bunker and Ciccantell 2005). In particular, developed 
countries require large quantities of natural resources to fuel their consumption oriented 
lifestyles and obtain those resources from LDCs (Jorgenson, Austin and Dick 2009). This 
                                                          
1  FDI is operationalized by the World Bank (2014) as ownership of a controlling number of shares of a business 
in one country by a business or other entity located in a second country. Thus, monetary amounts for FDI reflect 
those controlling shares.  
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allows companies located primarily in the developed world to invest in natural resource 
extraction in developing countries where the extraction is also cheaper and bolsters profit-
making.  To date, there is not much scholarly work examining the association between FDI 
and natural resource extraction.  Asiedu (2006), for example, examined whether natural 
resource extraction and FDIs are related in sub-Saharan Africa. Asiedu found that in addition 
to several other factors, larger natural resource endowments provide “opportunities” for 
resource extraction that promote increases in FDI. While natural resource availability may 
attract FDI, the additional question is whether FDI continues to drive natural resource 
extraction upward, which in turn would increase the proportion of gross domestic product of 
natural resource exporting LDCs that can be linked to those exports.  
Natural Resources, the Transnational Organization of Production and FDI 
 In this section we review discussions concerning the relationship between economic 
production and ecological disorganization. We also link that discussion to ecostructural 
theory and research on the impact of FDI on LDCs.  
In his classic work, The Environment: From Surplus to Scarcity, Schnaiberg (1980) 
noted that there are two main types of environmental degradation (or as he called it, 
ecological disorganization); ecological additions and withdrawals. In his theoretical 
approach, referred to as the treadmill of production, Schnaiberg suggested that the 
international capitalist economy necessitates ever-increasing levels of ecological additions 
and withdrawals to generate economic growth.  Ecological additions are by-products of the 
production process added to the environment (i.e. pollution).  Ecological withdrawals consist 
of the removal of natural resources to aid in production.  The present study focuses on 
ecological withdrawals, specifically the extraction of energy (i.e. coal, natural gas and oil), 
forest and mineral resources.  In the treadmill of production view, these non-renewable 
resources are being extracted at an increasing rate as the treadmill expands, which accelerates 
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resource reserve depletion and increases ecological disorganization.  As Schnaiberg (1980) 
and others (Jorgenson 2008, 2010) have noted, the ecological withdrawal process is harmful 
to the environment and easily documented in relation to many major contemporary 
withdrawal technologies (e.g., mountain top removal mining; sand tar extraction; hydraulic 
fracturing).    
The treadmill of production is a global process as production and consumption often 
do not take place in the same location. In fact, extraction of raw materials often occurs in one 
location, production in a second and consumption in a third (Gould, Pellow and Schnaiberg 
2008).  This suggests that consumers as well as producers in wealthy countries can maintain 
high levels of consumption while externalizing the costs of withdrawal (e.g. the extraction of 
already scarce resources and ecological disorganization from the extraction/production 
process) to LDCs. This process has been characterized as the transnational organization of 
production (e.g. Jorgenson 2008) to signify how economic production and its consequences 
have become increasingly globalized (see also Schnaiberg 1980). 
Research has demonstrated how the transnational organization of production creates 
ecological disorganization through ecological withdrawals (e.g. Jorgenson 2008, 2010) that 
predominately takes place in LDCs. One mechanism through which the ecological 
withdrawal of natural resources for production in LDCs is initiated from the developed world 
is through increases in FDI. Firms directing FDI to LDC resource extraction also attempt to 
accelerate extraction to allow continued production (Bunker and Ciccantell 2005).  In turn, 
LDC reliance on FDI can encourage LDCs to deplete their natural resources to facilitate 
domestic economic development because they are “foreign investment dependent” (or capital 
dependent, see Chase-Dunn 1975; Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 1985; Dixon and Boswell 
1996; Firebaugh 1996).  The theoretical tradition of foreign investment dependence suggests 
that increases in FDI stocks increases LDCs’ vulnerability to the negative effects of global 
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capitalism (Jorgenson 2010: 459), including impaired economic growth (Dixon and Boswell 
1996). Foreign investment dependence has also been linked to increasing levels of ecological 
disorganization (Jorgenson 2007a, b, 2008, 2010; Jorgenson, Dick and Muhutga 2007; 
Jorgenson and Kuykendall 2008;). 
To help conceptualise this process, Jorgenson and colleagues have introduced an 
ecostructural theory of foreign investment dependence that focuses on how, “the 
transnational organization of extraction and production in the context of foreign investment 
dependence partially allows for more developed countries and the transnational firms 
headquartered within them to treat less developed countries as supply depots as well as sinks 
for waste” (Jorgenson 2010: 459-460, emphasis added).  This perspective is particularly 
relevant for studying the effects of FDI on natural resource extraction because natural 
resource laden LDCs submit to economic restructuring to attract FDI which, in turn, 
stimulates LDC ecological disorganization through escalating resource extraction and 
ecological additions associated with those extraction processes. This process can be promoted 
by LDCs adopting lax environmental and labor regulations in order to enhance the likelihood 
of FDI (Jorgenson 2010). According to Jorgenson (2010), then, the ecostructural theory of 
foreign investment dependence suggests that increased FDI promotes growth in LDC natural 
resource extraction and is associated with the transnational organization of production and 
efforts to locate cheap supply depots of natural resources. 
A debate has emerged around whether LDC reliance on the natural resource sector for 
economic development is beneficial or deleterious (e.g. Sachs and Warner 1995, 2001; Bulte, 
Damania and Deacon 2005).  One argument – the “resource curse” – states that nations with 
significant ecological resources are disadvantaged with respect to economic growth (e.g. 
Ross 1999). Explanations for the curse vary, but there is some suggestion that natural 
resource rich economies may crowd out the manufacturing sector of the economy by 
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concentrating on resource exportation, leading to diminished finished product exports, which 
harms economic growth (Sachs and Warner 2001). In turn, countries focused mainly on 
exporting natural resources as a strategy of economic growth experience deteriorating 
economic growth. Natural resource curse researchers also propose that an abundance of 
resources may diminish state institutions and make them economically and socially 
ineffective so they are unable to enact sound economic policies to grow the economy (Ross 
2003; Mehlum, Moene and Torvik 2006). Because the curse has not been found to operate in 
all countries there is now an argument that some countries benefit and some are harmed by 
resources abundance. Moreover, scholars who reject the research curse hypothesis argue 
instead that natural resource extraction drives economic development and “institutional 
quality” (e.g. Brunnschweiler 2008; Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2008).  In fact, numerous 
researchers have suggested that empirical analyses that support the resource curse hypothesis 
ignore flaws in the analyses and misinterpret the findings (Wright and Czelusta 2004; Ding 
and Field 2005; Stijns 2005; Brunnschweiler 2008; Saad-Filho and Weeks 2013:4).  Given 
these conflicting findings related to the effect of natural resource income on LDC economic 
development, one can conclude that these unstable results indicate the need to abandon or 
revisit, refine and reevaluate this hypothesis to gain a better understanding of how foreign 
direct investments impact LDCs in the transnational global economy. 
Despite contradictory evidence concerning the effects of FDI on LDCs, it can be 
argued that LDC reliance on natural resource income as an engine for economic growth has 
implications for the ecological disorganization and the transnational organization of 
production perspectives. Here we begin with the observation that nations dependent on 
natural resource income for growth will likely continue to expand resource extraction to 
attract foreign investment, thereby increasing levels of ecological withdrawals. This 
observation is consistent with the ecostructural argument that FDI increases natural resource 
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extraction to satisfy the needs of the transnational organization of production.  Thus, it is 
reasonable to assume a similar pattern exists between FDI and natural resource income.  
Foreign firms invest capital in a country with natural resources in order to extract them to 
increase production.  These firms hope that their invested capital provides inexpensive raw 
materials which should contribute to an increase in profits. Furthermore, firms that invest 
foreign capital into another country and receive increased profits from their investment 
should be more likely to increase their future levels of FDI in that country in hope of 
continuing the profit-making cycle from natural resource extraction. If this process unfolds in 
the above manner, FDI could contribute to countries becoming more dependent on the natural 
resource sector for economic growth. This situation could also, therefore, reinforce the 
current organization of the transnational economy and the treadmill of production. 
Hypotheses 
Based on the above, we forward two hypotheses. First, that increases in the level of FDI a 
country receives will be associated with increases in the extraction of that country’s natural 
resources.  Second, increases in the level of FDI a country receives will be associated with 
increases in the amount of income a country generates from the sale of natural resources 
relative to other income sources.  These hypotheses have importance for the following 
reasons.  With respect to hypothesis 1, if the FDI-resource extraction link is observed, this 
supports the idea that FDI drives ecological disorganization in receiving nations. Evidence of 
the second hypothesis would suggest that counties receiving FDI are becoming more 
dependent on that income, and as this process continues and the stock of natural resources in 
FDI receiving nations declines, so too might FDI, leading to declining economic conditions 
in FDI receiving nations.  Below we elaborate on the measures of the variables we employ in 
our analyses to examine the relationship between FDI, natural resource extraction and natural 
resource income. 
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Method 
To examine the relationships between natural resource extraction, rents and FDI we employ 
fixed-effects panel models based on longitudinal data from the period 2005-2013 for a 
sample of 125 Less Developed Countries (LDCs) (see Appendix A for list of countries).  
Countries were defined as LDCs using the United Nations country classification scheme 
(United Nations, 2014).  The fixed-effects model can be specified as follows: 
Yct = XctB + αc + ect for t = 1,…,T and c = 1,…N 
Where Yct is the dependent variable for the country c at time t, Xct is a 1 by k matrix of 
predictor variables, αc is the unobserved time-variant country effect and ect is the error term.  
The nations were chosen due to the availability of data, meaning that all countries in the 
analysis were required to have values of the dependent variables and total FDI stocks over the 
time period, to be included in the sample.  The analysis controls for several competing 
explanations depicting the relationship between FDI and natural resource depletion and rents.  
All of the variables in the analyses, except democracy, were skewed, and were transformed 
into natural logs to reduce the impact of the skewness.  The variables used in the analysis are 
described below.    
Dependent Variables 
Natural resource depletion. The natural resource extraction variable for LDCs was 
operationalized as an indicator of the ratio of the volume of natural resources extracted to the 
quantity of remaining resource reserves. This measure of extraction can be conceptualized as 
measuring natural resource depletion and is obtained from the World Bank (2016). The 
World Bank collects depletion data on energy, forest, mineral resources and their sum. 
Depletion is defined as the ratio of the value of the stock of resources to the remaining 
reserve lifetime as a percent of the country’s GDP.  Energy resources include coal, crude oil 
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and natural gas, forest rents include the total roundwood harvest, and mineral depletion 
includes tin, gold, lead, zinc, iron, copper, nickel, silver, bauxite and phosphate. 
Natural resource rents. This variable measures the income generated from natural 
resources in the form of natural resource rents. In this context, rent is essentially the surplus 
value gained from the sale of the resources, or the difference between the cost of production 
and their price/value on the world market. In this study, natural resource rents are measured 
in two ways: (1) rents for forest, mineral, and energy2 are examined separately, and (2) then 
summed to create the measure total natural resource rents (World Bank 2016). A “rent” value 
is the difference between the value of production at world prices and their total cost of 
production.  This variable is measured as the percentage of the country’s GDP that is due to 
natural resource rents. 
Independent Variables3 
Total FDI stocks, measured in millions of USD as percent of host country GDP, is the 
total value of capital provided by foreign firms to the host country in all sectors of the 
economy (UNCTAD 2016).  
Control Variables 
GDP per capita.  Previous research has indicated that economic development and 
natural resource extraction are related (Sachs and Warner 1995; Ross 1999; Bulte, Damania 
and Deacon 2005).  To control for a county’s level of economic development we use Gross 
Domestic Product per capita (World Bank 2016). 
                                                          
2 Energy rents equal the sum of coal, natural gas and oil rents.  We collapsed these them into “energy” because 
the World Bank only reports energy depletion for our other dependent variable, resource depletion.  Energy 
depletion is also equal to the sum of coal, natural gas and oil depletion.  So, we collapsed the energy rent 
variable for consistency. 
3 We would like to recognize the importance of the work of Jorgenson and colleagues (e.g. Jorgenson 2007a, 
2007b; Jorgenson, Dick and Mahutga, 2007; Jorgenson and Kuykendall, 2008;) on FDI and various 
environmental outcomes.  These works have shaped the analytical approach of this paper, particularly the 
selection of independent and control variables. 
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Agriculture exports and Fuel exports. These two indicators control for the level of 
agricultural and fuel exports originating from the host country (World Bank 2016).  These 
variables are measured as a percent of the host country’s GDP. 
Gross capital formation, (also referred to as gross domestic investment) is a measure 
of a county’s net addition of capital stock.  Capital stock contributes to a county’s ability to 
provide goods and services to its population.  Increases in capital stock are referred to as 
capital formation (World Bank 2016). 
Agriculture value added and Industry value added. These two variables control for the 
extent to which the host country is agriculture or industry based respectively.  We measure 
these controls as the percent of total country GDP (World Bank 2016). 
Democracy. It is possible that the type of government affects the level of natural 
resource depletion and rents in a country.  We control for this using the Freedom of the 
World Democracy Index created by Freedom House (2016), which scores a country’s 
political freedom over time on a seven-point scale, “1” (most free) to “7” (least free).  We 
reverse coded the democracy index so higher values indicated higher political freedom. 
Exports of goods and services. In addition to the industry specific controls (i.e. 
agriculture and fuel) for the degree to which a country relies on exports for economic growth, 
we also control for the percent of a country’s GDP that is generated from all exports of goods 
and services (World Bank 2016).  This is a measure of trade dependency, the degree to which 
a country is dependent on trade for economic growth. 
External debt service. The level of external debt that a country has may be linked to 
natural resource depletion and rents as the economic restructuring requirements that 
accompany loans from international financial institutions like the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund often require countries to reorient their economies to more 
export-oriented strategies (McMichael 2004).  External debt service is the sum of principal 
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repayments and interest paid on short-term and long-term debt and repayments to the IMF.  It 
is measured as a percent of the country’s GDP (World Bank 2016). 
Analytic Strategy 
We first tested FDI stocks and natural resource depletion and rents for endogeneity using 
Granger causality tests to determine casual ordering of these variables. Next, to test our 
hypotheses we used longitudinal data for the years 2005-2013 for a sample of 125 LDCs.  We 
estimated fixed-effects panel regression models to test the effects of the predictors on annual 
changes in natural resource depletion and rents during 2005-2013, while controlling for 
country characteristics not explicitly included in the models (i.e., omitted variable bias).  
Fixed-effects models the within country changes in the dependent variable that are due to the 
combination of predictors in the model.  Between country effects are not estimated.  In these 
models, due to a lack of adequate time-series data on primary sector FDI stocks, the main 
independent variable of interest is total FDI stocks.4  
We estimated eight fixed-effects models of natural resource depletion and rents each 
to test our hypotheses.5  We estimated two models for each of the eight dependent variables: 
total natural resource depletion, energy depletion, forest depletion, mineral depletion, total 
natural resource rents, energy rents, forest rents and mineral rents.  The first models include 
only FDI stocks, while the second model adds in all of the controls. 
 We assessed multicollinearity in the models with Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
values.  We reran the fixed-effects models using ordinary least squares equations and then 
calculated VIF values based on those equations.  The mean VIF for all predictors of resource 
                                                          
4 We used total FDI stocks, rather than primary sector FDI stocks, in the longitudinal models because 
longitudinal data on primary sector FDI stocks was not available for the study time period.  We recognize that 
previous studies that examine the link between FDI and environmental outcomes have employed primary sector 
FDI data (e.g. Jorgenson 2007; Jorgenson and Kuykendall 2008), however those studies utilized data primarily 
from the 1990s and early 2000s, to our knowledge primary sector FDI data is not available for the time period of 
the current study (2005-2013). See Appendix B for models using 2010 primary sector FDI stocks for a small 
sample of countries in which data were available. 
5 The sample sizes vary from model to model due to missing data. 
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depletion was 1.99 (range = 1.11-3.66), while resource rents was 1.96 (range = 1.11-3.65).  
These values indicate that multicollinearity does not appear to substantively affect the results, 
as VIF values under four typically mean low multicollinearity (Madalla 1992). 
Results 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for the untransformed versions of the variables in 
the analysis.  We first tested for endogeneity of FDI and the two dependent variables, natural 
resource depletion and rents as some previous research suggests that the causal ordering of 
these concepts is reversed (see Asiedu 2006).  To do this, we gathered data on FDI stocks, 
natural resource depletion and rents for the time-period 1970-2013.  Using these data, we 
conducted Granger Causality Wald tests for FDI and natural resource depletion and FDI and 
natural resource rents.  In both cases, the null hypothesis that FDI does not “Granger-cause”6 
natural resource depletion (Wald χ2 = 7.56, p = 0.023) and rents (Wald χ2 = 8.49, p = 0.014) 
was rejected.  The reverse tests with the natural resource variables (depletion Wald χ2 = 2.23, 
p = 0.328; rents Wald χ2 = 2.51, p = 0.285) as the Granger-cause of FDI were not rejected 
indicating that the resource variables are not a cause of FDI.  Therefore, these results suggest 
that FDI should be used as a predictor of natural resource depletion and rents, not the reverse. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 2 contains fixed-effects regression equations modelling the natural resource 
depletion variables.  Based on the models in Table 2, it is clear that annual increases in FDI 
stocks are associated with annual increases in all of the natural resource depletion variables in 
this study.  In other words, as the amount of FDI stocks increase, so too does total natural 
resource (Total NR 2 – p<0.01), energy (Energy 2 – p<0.001), forest (Forest 2 – p<0.05) and 
mineral (Mineral 2 – p<0.05) depletion, controlling for the other explanations of natural 
                                                          
6 The Granger causality test is a hypothesis test designed for determining whether one time-series variable is 
useful for predicting a second time-series variable. (see Granger 1969, 2004). 
15 
 
resource depletion included in the models.  These findings strongly support hypothesis 1 due 
to the consistent effect of FDI across the dependent variables.  
GDP per capita significantly predicts each of the natural resource depletion variables; 
however the direction of the relationship is inconsistent.  Annual increases in GDP per capita 
are positively related to total natural resource, forest and mineral depletion, while it is 
negatively related to energy depletion.  Another important predictor of natural resource 
depletion, according to the results in Table 2, is exports of goods and services.  With the 
exception of forest depletion, annual increases in exports and goods and services significantly 
predicts the resource depletion variables (p<0.001), suggesting that in most cases as countries 
increase exports, natural resources will be withdrawn from the environment in larger 
amounts.  The remaining control variables are sporadically significant; however, no 
meaningful patterns emerge in the prediction of the resource depletion variables. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 3 reports the results of fixed-effects regression models of total natural resource, 
energy, forest and mineral rents.  FDI stocks positively predict annual changes in all of the 
natural resource rents variables except energy.  Annual increases in FDI stocks are associated 
with significantly higher total natural resource, forest and mineral rents, while there is no 
relationship between FDI stocks and energy rents. Therefore, hypothesis 2 has been 
supported for all natural resource rents variables with the exception of energy rents. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Unlike the natural resource depletion models, GDP per capita does not appear to be as 
important a predictor of the resource rents variables.  It positively predicts mineral rents 
(p<0.001), but does not significantly predict any of the other rents variables.  Similar to the 
resource depletion models, exports of goods and service is a significant predictor of natural 
resource rents in all of the models. 
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Earlier we noted that primary sector FDI stock data are not available for the time 
period of this study and historical cross-national time-series primary sector FDI data are 
sporadic at best.  However, we have included a brief analysis of total natural resource 
depletion and rents using primary sector FDI stocks and the control variables using least 
squares regression equations in Appendix B.  The models are based on a sample of 2010 data 
for 52 countries, both developed and less developed (due to availability of data). The results 
support our findings above since increases in primary sector FDI stocks is associated with 
increases in total natural resource depletion and rents. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
It has long been assumed that LDCs are exploited for their natural resources and may build 
their economies on unsustainable natural resource income. Moreover, the impact of FDI on 
many social and environmental outcomes has been studied in detail by social scientists. We 
contribute to this area of study by examining the impact of FDI on natural resource depletion 
and rents for LDCs. We hypothesized that annual increases in FDI will lead to annual 
increases in natural resource depletion within countries (hypothesis 1), and that annual 
increases in FDI will lead to annual increases in natural resource rents within countries 
(hypothesis 2).  Our findings lend substantial support to both hypotheses.  Increases in FDI 
stocks were associated with increases in all forms of natural resource depletion and all forms 
of natural resource rents, except energy rents.  These finding suggest that among LDCs, FDI 
increases natural resource depletion. Moreover, since resource rents also increase as a result 
of FDI, it appears that the transnational organization of production contributes to many LDCs 
becoming more and more dependent on the natural resource sector of their economies. We 
will now expand on the implication of both of these findings. 
 First, FDI increases natural resource depletion in LDCs pushing them toward 
environmentally unsustainable behaviour. This relationship between FDI and resource 
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depletion also means that FDI is likely to increase ecological disorganization in LDCs. 
Importantly, it is likely the case that the ecological disorganization resulting from resource 
depletion includes the actual depletion that occurs, but also the environmental externalities 
generated from the extraction and production of natural resources. This process unfolds as the 
ecostructural theory of foreign investment dependence asserts it will (Jorgenson 2010).  That 
is, our results suggest that the transnational organization of production uses foreign capital to 
obtain the raw materials necessary for production, while turning LDCs with large natural 
resource endowments into supply depots for other countries. 
 Second, we find that FDI increases natural resource rents within LDCs. This suggests 
that foreign investment may also contribute to making the economies of LDCs more 
dependent on their natural resource sector for economic growth.  While evidence is mixed 
regarding the impact of natural resource rents on future economic growth there is still reason 
for concern because several studies have suggested that such conditions foster “resource 
addition” or a “natural resource curse” (e.g. Freudenberg 1992; Ross 1999; Sachs and Warner 
1995, 2001).  Given that there is a substantial theoretical and empirical literature 
documenting these adverse conditions we suggest that policy makers in these countries 
should be weary of becoming too dependent on resource extraction and sales for economic 
development. Additionally, as foreign capital is contributing to this resource dependency, 
these countries are also losing some control over their own economic policy decisions. For 
example, a government of a LDC that is heavily reliant on natural resource rents may be 
unable to move away from economic policies that focus primarily on natural resources to 
pursue a more profitable part of the transnational organization of production without 
considerable consequences. Such a situation may place countries in a state of perpetual 
subordination to more developed countries in a way that supports the global treadmill of 
production as is suggested by ecostructural theory. 
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 Future research is needed to address this issue further. Using historical data, research 
could, for example, locate nations where FDI investment has driven available natural 
resource stocks in LDCs to low levels.  Once these nations are identified, researchers can 
then examine how the economies of those nations are affected.  Future researchers should 
also focus more closely on understanding the mechanisms linking FDI to the specific 
resource depletion and rents that are the subject of the paper. 
 We need to acknowledge several limitations to this study.  First, the dataset was 
limited to countries with available data; the number of countries available for use in any 
specific estimate was also affected by the availability of control variables.  Second, because 
reliable time-series primary sector FDI stock data is not available we use total FDI stocks as 
the main independent variable.  This was not ideal because specific stock data would have 
provided a more accurate measure of our primary independent variable. As a result, we 
believe the relationships in our study may be attenuated by measurement error. Moreover, we 
supplemented these findings with cross-sectional results using primary sector FDI stock as 
the main independent variable for a sample of LDCs where data were available. These 
additional cross-sectional analyses found strong relationships between primary sector FDI 
stocks and natural resource depletion and rents suggesting that the relationship is correctly 
estimated in our longitudinal analysis. 
In the end our findings suggest that FDI increases natural resource depletion and the 
income generated from that depletion (i.e. rents).  Consequently, it appears that foreign 
capital increases ecological disorganization in LDCs, while also making these countries more 
dependent on natural resources for economic growth, which may harm the health of their 
economies over the long term.  The transnational organization of production has generated 
economic growth for many countries, however it appears that it also increases and displaces 
19 
 
ecological disorganization, while giving foreign firms influence over LDCs’ approach to 
economic growth. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Untransformed Variables in the Analysis 
 
  
 Mean Standard Deviation Skewness n 
Natural resource depletion 7.86 11.68 2.64 1512 
Energy depletion 4.60 10.70 3.56 1718 
Forest depletion 1.64 4.25 4.07 1522 
Mineral depletion 0.97 2.73 4.47 1737 
Natural resource rents 9.83 15.72 2.15 1926 
Energy rents 6.74 15.10 2.66 1780 
Forest rents 2.45 5.06 3.74 1608 
Mineral rents 1.65 4.91 5.57 1747 
FDI stocks 0.54 0.75 4.53 1654 
GDP per capita 14085.7 21875.1 2.89 1747 
Agriculture exports 3.65 7.94 5.28 1364 
Agriculture value added 13.10 12.84 1.36 1523 
Fuel exports 16.78 26.57 1.89 1325 
Gross capital formation 24.54 8.68 1.50 1538 
Industry value added 29.38 14.52 1.38 1523 
Democracy 4.64 2.07 -0.38 1314 
Exports of goods and services 43.84 29.22 2.75 1646 
External debt service 4.00 6.87 11.20 1047 
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Table 2. Fixed-Effects Regression Coefficients (b) and Standard Errors (SE) of Determinants of 
Natural Resource Depletion Variables  
for Less Developed Countries, 2005-2013 
 Total 
NR 1 
Total 
NR 2 
Energy 1 Energy 2 Forest 1 Forest 
2 
Mineral 
1 
Mineral 
2 
 b b b b b b b b 
 (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) 
FDI stocks 
(ln) 
0.21*** 0.15** 0.29*** 0.44*** 0.15*** 0.14* 0.88*** 0.33* 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.03) (0.06) (0.12) (0.13) 
GDP per 
capita (ln) 
 0.15#  -0.35**  0.24*  1.61*** 
  (0.09)  (0.12)  (0.10)  (0.21) 
Agricultur
e exports 
(ln) 
 -0.15**  -0.11  -0.01  -0.21# 
  (0.04)  (0.07)  (0.05)  (0.11) 
Agricultur
e value 
added (ln) 
 0.18  0.12  0.41#  -0.01 
  (0.20)  (0.27)  (0.23)  (0.48) 
Fuel 
exports 
(ln) 
 0.01  0.09**  -0.01  0.03 
  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.04) 
Gross 
capital 
formation 
(ln) 
 -0.01  0.40**  -0.01  -0.33 
  (0.10)  (0.12)  (0.15)  (0.22) 
Industry 
value 
added (ln) 
 0.73**  1.26***  0.03  -0.24 
  (0.23)  (0.33)  (0.28)  (0.53) 
Democrac
y 
 0.02  -0.03  -0.06  0.28** 
  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.08) 
Exports of 
goods and 
services 
(ln) 
 0.64**
* 
 0.93***  0.09  1.28*** 
  (0.15)  (0.23)  (0.17)  (0.36) 
External 
debt 
service 
(ln) 
 -0.02  -0.08  0.12*  -0.18* 
  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.09) 
Constant 4.40*** -2.81 4.92*** 0.57 2.00*** -1.29 12.15**
* 
-12.03** 
 (0.55) (1.91) (1.07) (2.78) (0.50) (2.18) (1.74) (4.48) 
N 1029 572 646 389 710 387 773 490 
F 34.76**
* 
8.66**
* 
17.16**
* 
14.95**
* 
21.86**
* 
2.27*
* 
58.20**
* 
17.99**
* 
R2 within 0.04 0.15 0.03 0.31 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.30 
Note: ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, #p<0.10 significance (two-tailed). 
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Table 3. Fixed-Effects Regression Coefficients (b) and Standard Errors (SE) of Determinants of 
Natural Resource Rents Variables  
for Less Developed Countries, 2005-2013 
 Total 
NR 3 
Total 
NR 4 
Energ
y 3 
Energy 
4 
Forest 3 Forest 
4 
Mineral 
3 
Mineral 
4 
 b b b b b b b b 
 (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) 
FDI stocks 
(ln) 
0.23*** 0.08# -0.15 -0.46 0.16*** 0.19**
* 
0.69*** 0.23# 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.38) (0.58) (0.02) (0.04) (0.11) (0.13) 
GDP per 
capita (ln) 
 0.01  0.59  0.02  1.37**
* 
  (0.06)  (0.51)  (0.06)  (0.20) 
Agricultur
e exports 
(ln) 
 -0.03  0.27  -0.04  -0.21* 
  (0.03)  (0.40)  (0.03)  (0.10) 
Agricultur
e value 
added (ln) 
 -0.09  0.92  0.37**  0.39 
  (0.13)  (1.09)  (0.13)  (0.45) 
Fuel 
exports 
(ln) 
 0.03**  1.09*  0.0002  0.05 
  (0.01)  (0.47)  (0.009)  (0.04) 
Gross 
capital 
formation 
(ln) 
 -0.05  1.12  -0.07  -0.24 
  (0.07)  (0.86)  (0.07)  (0.21) 
Industry 
value 
added (ln) 
 0.62***  2.54  -0.56**  -0.05 
  (0.16)  (1.66)  (0.16)  (0.50) 
Democrac
y 
 0.04#  0.22  0.001  0.25** 
  (0.03)  (0.20)  (0.03)  (0.08) 
Exports of 
goods and 
services 
(ln) 
 0.57***  3.54**  0.18#  1.19** 
  (0.11)  (1.07)  (0.11)  (0.35) 
External 
debt 
service (ln) 
 0.02  -0.08  0.06*  -0.18* 
  (0.03)  (0.35)  (0.03)  (0.08) 
Constant 4.98*** -1.19 -5.45 -
44.93*
* 
2.22*** 3.15* 9.79*** -
12.62*
* 
 (0.76) (1.32) (5.78) (13.77) (0.35) (1.33) (1.67) (4.25) 
N 1116 598 277 191 1107 593 777 491 
F 20.90**
* 
11.02**
* 
0.15 3.16**
* 
50.88**
* 
6.62**
* 
39.13**
* 
14.58 
R2 within 0.02 0.18 0.001 0.17 0.05 0.12 0.05 0.26 
Note: ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, #p<0.10 significance (two-tailed). 
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Appendix A. List of Countries in the Analysis. 
Afghanistan Djibouti Lebanon Sao Tome and 
Principe 
Albania Dominica Lesotho Senegal 
Algeria Dominican Republic Liberia Serbia 
Angola Ecuador Libya Seychelles 
Argentina Egypt Macedonia Sierra Leone 
Armenia El Salvador Madagascar Solomon Islands 
Azerbaijan Eritrea Malawi South Africa 
Bangladesh Ethiopia Malaysia Sri Lanka 
Belarus Fiji Maldives St. Lucia 
Belize Gabon Mali St. Vincent 
Benin Gambia, The Mauritania Sudan 
Bhutan Georgia Mexico Suriname 
Bolivia Ghana Moldova Swaziland 
Bosnia and Herz. Guatemala Mongolia Syria 
Botswana Guinea Montenegro Tajikistan 
Brazil Guinea-Bissau Morocco Tanzania 
Bulgaria Guyana Mozambique Thailand 
Burkina Faso Haiti Namibia Timor-Leste 
Burundi Honduras Nepal Togo 
Cabo Verde Hungary Nicaragua Tonga 
Cambodia India Niger Tunisia 
Cameroon Indonesia Nigeria Turkey 
Cen. African Rep. Iran Pakistan Turkmenistan 
Chad Iraq Panama Uganda 
China Jamaica Papua New Guinea Ukraine 
Colombia Jordan Paraguay Uzbekistan 
Comoros Kazakhstan Peru Vanuatu 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Kenya Philippines Venezuela 
Congo, Rep. Kiribati Romania Vietnam 
Costa Rica Kyrgyz Republic Rwanda Yemen 
Cote d’Ivoire Lao PDR Samoa Zambia 
   Zimbabwe 
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Appendix B. Least Squares Regression Coefficients (b) and Standard Errors (SE) for Determinants of 
Natural Resource Depletion and Rents, 2010a 
 Total NR 
Depletion 
Total NR 
Depletion 
Total NR 
Rents 
Total NR 
Rents 
 b b b b 
 (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) 
Primary sector FDI stocks 
(ln)b 
0.64*** 
(0.10) 
0.50*** 
(0.08) 
0.58*** 
(0.08) 
0.45*** 
(0.07) 
     
GDP per capita (ln)  -0.49#  -0.42# 
  (0.28)  (0.22) 
Agriculture exports (ln)  0.09  0.13 
  (0.20)  (0.16) 
Agriculture value added 
(ln) 
 0.13  0.007 
  (0.39)  (0.32) 
Fuel exports (ln)  0.16#  0.15* 
  (0.08)  (0.07) 
Gross capital formation (ln)  -1.59#  -0.77 
  (0.84)  (0.68) 
Industry value added (ln)  2.99**  2.28** 
  (0.80)  (0.65) 
Democracy  0.12  0.14 
  (0.15)  (0.12) 
Exports of goods and 
services (ln) 
 -0.11  -0.05 
  (0.32)  (0.26) 
LDCc 0.37 -0.52 0.29 -0.42 
 (0.36) (0.51) (0.31) (0.41) 
Constant 11.70*** 8.59# 11.26*** 7.40* 
 (1.85) (4.30) (1.57) (3.47) 
N 52 47 52 47 
F 25.87*** 12.14*** 29.16*** 14.36*** 
Adjusted R2 0.49 0.71 0.52 0.74 
Notes: ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, #p<0.10 significance (two-tailed). aExternal debt service is not included 
in the models due to the volume of missing values. b Primary sector FDI stocks is the value of capital provided 
by foreign firms to the host county in the primary sector of the economy (i.e. agriculture and mining), measured 
by percent of host country GDP (ITC 2015).  cDue to the small number of countries with primary sector FDI 
stocks data, we included both LDC and developed countries, the LDC indicator controls for this. 
             
 
